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CONCEALED MOTIVES:
RETHINKING FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
VOTING RIGHTS CHALLENGES TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Lauren Latterell Powell*
Felon disenfranchisement provisions are justified by many Americans under
the principle that voting is a privilege to be enjoyed only by upstanding citizens.
The provisions are intimately tied, however, to the country’s legacy of racism and
systemic disenfranchisement and are at odds with the values of American democ-
racy. In virtually every state, felon disenfranchisement provisions affect the poor
and communities of color on a grossly disproportionate scale. Yet to date, most
challenges to the provisions under the Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights
Act have been unsuccessful, frustrating proponents of re-enfranchisement and the
disenfranchised alike.
In light of those failures, is felon disenfranchisement here to stay? This Note
contemplates that question, beginning with a comprehensive analysis of the history
of felon disenfranchisement provisions in America, tracing their roots to the large-
scale effort to disenfranchise African Americans during Reconstruction, and identi-
fying ways in which the racism of the past reverberates through practices of disen-
franchisement in the present day. Applying this knowledge to understandings of
prior case law and recent voting rights litigation, a path forward begins to emerge.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to vote has long been regarded as one of the major corner-
stones of democracy. Perhaps more than any other act of civic engage-
ment, voting represents inclusion in society and has the potential to inform
an individual’s views about membership in his or her community.1 As
such, over the course of American history, the literal and symbolic power
of the vote has compelled countless groups to fight for their right to the
franchise. Most of these groups have been successful,2 allowing them
greater ability to shape their communities and enhanced civic inclusion.
Despite the significance of the vote, one group—felons and ex-
felons—has been systematically denied this right on a massive scale. Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits disenfranchisement “for
participation in rebellion or other crime.”3 Forty-eight states have felon
disenfranchisement laws, of which twelve states ban voting for ex-felons
indefinitely or for a specific number of years after sentence completion.4
As a result, approximately six million Americans are disenfranchised due to
felon voting bans today.5 These laws disproportionately affect African
Americans and Latinos.6 In 2016, African Americans were four times
more likely to be disenfranchised than Whites, with one in thirteen other-
wise eligible African Americans of voting age denied the right to vote.7
While the number of disenfranchised includes violent offenders, it also
includes those convicted of non-violent offenses.8 In 2012, at least 51% of
inmates in state and federal prisons had been convicted of non-violent
1. See Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence
from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 195–97 (2004).
2. “Successful” is of course a relative term, and is used here only to describe the formal
expansion of the franchise to previously disenfranchised groups, such as African Americans and
women.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also II(A), infra.
4. JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRI-
MER 1 (updated May 2016).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id.
8. See Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/criminal-disenfranchisement-laws-
across-united-states.
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crimes.9 In twelve states, depending on the nature of the offense, individu-
als are disenfranchised even after successfully completing probation and
parole.10
Far from being fully reintegrated into their communities, disen-
franchised individuals are denied both the capacity to influence policies in
their communities and the dignity of political voice. Indeed, they are kept
on the social and political margins of society, unable to influence even
those policies that directly impact them—such as laws determining felons’
and ex-felons’ eligibility for public benefits—potentially increasing their
likelihood of recidivism.11 In fact, research suggests that ex-felons who are
allowed the vote and use it are less likely to face re-arrest and re-
incarceration.12
Along with affecting individuals’ abilities to reintegrate into their
communities, felon disenfranchisement provisions have had a significant
and tangible impact on American politics and electoral outcomes.13 Ex-
perts estimate that since 1970, at least seven senate elections and one presi-
dential election would have turned out differently had felons and ex-felons
been allowed to vote.14 In fact, in the notoriously contentious presidential
election of 2000, ultimately influenced by the outcome of the equally con-
tentious Supreme Court case Bush v. Gore,15 research shows Gore likely
would have won had ex-felons in Florida alone been granted the
franchise.16 And although we do not yet know the full implications of
felon disenfranchisement on the 2016 presidential election—the second in
just two decades where the winner of the popular vote did not win the
electoral vote—we can conjecture that the votes of felons and ex-felons
could have changed the election’s outcome.17
9. Incarcerated Felon Population by Type of Crime Committed, 1974-2012, PROCON.ORG
(last visited April 11, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://felonvoting.procon.org/view.resource.php?re
sourceID=004339.
10. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOT-
ERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 4 (2016). Note that the laws
in each of the 12 states referred to vary. Some disenfranchise only those convicted of multiple
non-violent felonies beyond completion of their sentence, while others disenfranchise first-time
offenders. Id.
11. See Manza, supra note 1 (describing results of a study regarding the correlation be-
tween voting and recidivism).
12. Id. at 213.
13. See generally Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Democratic Contraction? Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2002) (analyzing
the effect of felon disenfranchisement provisions on major U.S. elections from 1970–2000).
14. Id. at 789–92.
15. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16. Manza, supra note 13, at 792.
17. See id., for a discussion of the implications of felon disenfranchisement for U.S. elec-
tion results. See also Hannah Kozlowska, What Would Happen if Felons Could Vote in the US?
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While insights about the negative effects of felon disenfranchisement
on democratic elections are relatively recent, the practice is certainly not
new to the United States.18 Early Americans endorsed and adopted the
European custom of Civil Death, disenfranchising men convicted of spe-
cific crimes—typically those believed to be particularly offensive or vio-
lent.19 By the Civil War, a majority of states had ratified some form of
felon disenfranchisement into their constitutions or state laws.20
When African Americans were recognized as citizens and granted the
right to vote, felon disenfranchisement provisions became tools not only
for penalizing criminals, but for disenfranchising Americans of color on a
massive scale.21 While most voting restrictions enacted for the purpose of
disenfranchisement, such as literacy tests or poll taxes, were eliminated
with the passage of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and its amendments,22
felon disenfranchisement provisions have been virtually unaffected by the
Act. In some cases, in fact, they have expanded since the VRA’s passage.23
This Note contends that felon disenfranchisement in the U.S. re-
mains a racist and politically-motivated practice at odds with the values of
democracy. Drawing on examples of successful voting rights litigation, it
presents solutions to some of the challenges proponents of re-enfranchise-
ment have faced. Part I analyzes the history of felon disenfranchisement
provisions in the U.S. to reveal how the laws have contributed to the sys-
temic disenfranchisement of African Americans. Part II analyzes successes
and failures in the movement to re-enfranchise felons up to the present
day. Part III more closely examines how changing social and political con-
ditions have presented barriers to proving that felon disenfranchisement
provisions are motivated by racism, while Part IV explores how the racist
and political motives behind the laws present themselves today. Finally,
Part V first provides ideas about how to apply this knowledge and analysis
QUARTZ MEDIA (Oct. 6, 2016), https://qz.com/784503/what-would-happen-if-felons-could-
vote (discussing the potential implications of felon disenfranchisement on the 2016 election).
18. See Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”:
Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 562–63
(2003); CHUNG, supra note 4, at 2.
19. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 563; Pippa Holloway, “A Chicken Stealer Shall Lose His
Vote”: Disenfranchisement for Larceny in the South, 1874-1890, 75 J. S. HIST. 931, 933 (2009).
20. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 567. Figure 1 shows the percentage of states that disen-
franchised felons and ex-felons for each decade from 1788–2002. At the outset of the Civil War
in the early 1860s, over 70% of states had a felon disenfranchisement provision. Id.
21. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 563. See also CHUNG, supra note 3, at 3.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
23. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 565 (showing recent adoption of or changes in felon
disenfranchisement provisions in a table). See also Brief for Griffin—League of Women Voters as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 2016) (No.
15-1661) (arguing that Iowa’s policy of permanently disenfranchising felons, enacted in 2011, is
too restrictive); CHUNG, supra note 4, at 4 (showing changes in felon disenfranchisement laws
from 1997–2016, including more restrictive changes in Iowa, Kentucky, and South Dakota).
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to the appropriate constitutional test. It then explains why current political
and social conditions make this a critical moment in history to call atten-
tion to felon disenfranchisement.
I. A FORGOTTEN HISTORY ROOTED IN RACISM
Understanding what has led to the disenfranchisement of American
citizens on such a massive scale requires understanding the historical con-
text surrounding the disenfranchisement of felons in the United States.
This section analyzes the history of felon disenfranchisement laws to show
their ties to racist objectives, namely the systemic disenfranchisement of
people of color in the United States.
While felon disenfranchisement laws were adopted by most states
before the Civil War, the earliest forms of felony disenfranchisement laws
were typically reserved for the most violent criminals.24 Not until the Civil
War and the Reconstruction period did states begin to revise their felon
disenfranchisement laws on a substantial scale to make them more restric-
tive.25 In the decades following the passage of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, nearly every Southern state (with the exception of
Texas) amended its laws to disenfranchise those convicted of petty larceny
and related crimes.26 Therefore, for the first time in many states, those
convicted of non-violent crimes (previously labeled as misdemeanors)
could be disenfranchised.27 Some states achieved this by elevating the
crime of larceny from misdemeanor to felony status, while others ex-
panded the definition of felony larceny to include theft of livestock and
items of increasingly low monetary value.28
This wide-scale expansion of disenfranchisement to include those
convicted of petty larceny reflects the first major attempt by Whites to
disenfranchise Blacks in response to the new social and political power they
gained under the Reconstruction Amendments.29 Indeed, many Black cit-
izens and White Republicans of the time acknowledged the movement as
such, openly opposing felon disenfranchisement in front of Congress and
in the media.30 In 1880, larceny convictions became more frequent in the
months leading up to an election.31 And in behavior foretelling the inau-
guration of the Jim Crow era, some officials and poll workers successfully
24. Holloway, supra note 19, at 933.
25. Behrens, supra note 18, at 563.
26. Holloway, supra note 19, at 931.
27. See id. at 937–39.
28. See id.
29. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 564; Holloway, supra note 19, at 935.
30. See Holloway, supra note 19, at 942–43.
31. Id. at 932.
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incited false allegations of larceny or other criminal charges to keep Black
men out of the polls.32
The next wave of increasingly restrictive felon disenfranchisement
laws arrived during the Jim Crow Era.33 From 1889 through the early
1900s, changes to disenfranchisement provisions were characterized by re-
strictions placed on those convicted of crimes typically believed to be
committed more by Blacks than by Whites.34 These crimes were usually
those considered “furtive” offenses, including “thievery, adultery, arson,
wife-beating, housebreaking, and attempted rape.”35 Alabama—the only
state whose felon disenfranchisement law would later be struck down by
the Supreme Court due to Fourteenth Amendment violations36—explic-
itly acknowledged at its 1901 constitutional convention that the aim of the
state’s new disenfranchisement provisions was to perpetuate White
supremacy.37 And only a few years after Mississippi’s adoption of new
felon disenfranchisement laws, its Supreme Court explicitly recognized
that they were enacted with the intent of targeting African Americans:
“Restrained by the federal Constitution from discriminating against the
negro race, the [Mississippi] convention discriminated against its charac-
teristics and the offenses to which its weaker members were prone.”38
As later sections of this Note will elaborate on,39 while we do not
immediately view felon disenfranchisement laws as racially motivated, the
felon disenfranchisement provisions of today are not divorced from the ra-
cist motivations that gave rise to these laws in the first place. Politicians
continue to propagate notions of Black criminality to justify the marginal-
ization of felons and ex-felons from society, through both mass incarcera-
tion and disenfranchisement.40 Furthermore, despite the expansion of the
right to vote during the mid-to-late twentieth century for African Ameri-
cans and other groups, the War on Drugs and other “tough on crime”
policies implemented over the last 40 years have resulted in a drastic in-
crease in the number of disenfranchised individuals, from 1.17 million in
1976 to 6.1 million in 2016.41
32. See id. at 932, 951.
33. Behrens, supra note 18, at 564.
34. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights
Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 540–41 (1993).
35. Id. at 541.
36. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
37. See Shapiro, supra note 34, at 542.
38. Id. at 541.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
40. See Part IV(D), infra, for a discussion on this topic.
41. See CHUNG, supra note 4, at 3.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CHALLENGES
TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Since the Jim Crow Era, changes in felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions have been mixed.42 Although skeptics and opponents of felon disen-
franchisement have been fighting for change since the late 19th century,43
few of their court battles have been won. This section analyzes the legal
defeats and victories in the movement to re-enfranchise felons, which can
inform potential strategies moving forward.44
A. Equal Protection Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states
according to their respective numbers . . . But when the right
to vote . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced.45
Most claims attacking the constitutionality of felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions have done so on the basis that the provisions violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In 1974, the Supreme
Court in Richardson v. Ramirez46 first confronted whether felon disen-
franchisement laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.47 Although just a
decade earlier the Court had established the right to vote as a fundamental
right and held that restrictions on the franchise affecting any class of citi-
zens must be subject to strict scrutiny,48 it nevertheless held in Richardson
that California’s felon disenfranchisement provision did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.49
42. Id. at 4.
43. See Holloway, supra note 19, at 933, 941–42 (describing Reconstruction Era Republi-
cans’ resistance to the expansion of disenfranchisement to include those convicted of petty
crimes, which were believed by Southern Democrats to be committed more often by Blacks
than Whites).
44. See discussion infra Part V.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
46. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
47. Id.
48. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). Reynolds established the right to
vote as “a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society” and held that any infringement
on the right must be subject to careful and meticulous scrutiny. Id. For cases implementing the
Reynolds holding, see e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(holding that a poll tax which restricted the right to vote based on wealth violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking
down restrictions on the right to vote in school board elections as both over- and under-
inclusive).
49. Richardson, 418 U.S at 56
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The Richardson Court relied heavily on the text of Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which states, “representatives shall be appor-
tioned among the states in proportion to each state’s population, minus
any male who has been disenfranchised, with the exception of those disen-
franchised “for participation in rebellion or other crime.”50 According to
the Court, this language “distinguish[es] [felon disenfranchisement] laws
from those other state limitations on the franchise which have been held
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by the Court.”51 Put more sim-
ply, the Court found that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment posi-
tively affirms the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement and
therefore felons, as a class, have no constitutionally protected right to vote.
Because Richardson precluded any finding that disenfranchising felons
as a class violates the Equal Protection Clause, opponents of these laws
began to challenge disenfranchisement provisions instead on racial
grounds. In Johnson v. Governor of Florida, a group of ex-felons challenged
Florida’s constitutional amendment disenfranchising ex-felons under the
Equal Protection Clause, arguing that, although the provision was facially
neutral, racial animus motivated its passage.52 The 11th Circuit first reiter-
ated the Supreme Court’s finding in Richardson that “a state’s decision to
permanently disenfranchise convicted felons does not, in itself, constitute
an equal protection violation,”53 because Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly allows for it.54  Regarding the allegations of racial
animus and citing Washington v. Davis,55 the court acknowledged that a
facially neutral felon disenfranchisement provision enacted with racially
discriminatory intent would violate the Equal Protection Clause.56 None-
theless, the court ultimately determined that although Florida’s original
1885 constitutional amendment may have been motivated by racial ani-
mus, without a showing that the current and amended law was adopted
with racially discriminatory intent, there would be no Equal Protection
violation.57 Based on a finding that the state’s 1968 amendment to the
relevant 1885 provision was enacted without racially discriminatory intent,
the court upheld the statute.58
While Johnson does not make clear to what extent, or in what man-
ner, a state must amend its felon disenfranchisement provisions to legally
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
51. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
52. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1216–17 (2005).
53. Id. at 1217 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53-55).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
55. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a facially neutral law with a
racially disparate impact does not violate the Equal Protection Clause without a showing of
racially discriminatory intent).
56. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1215.
57. Id. at 1225.
58. Id.
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override the racial animus with which it was originally enacted, other pre-
cedent is more illuminating. In Cotton v. Fordice,59 the 5th Circuit applied
reasoning similar to that in Johnson to uphold Mississippi’s felon disen-
franchisement law; although the court acknowledged that the state’s 1890
provision was enacted for the purpose of disenfranchising Blacks, it held
that the 1968 amendment “superseded the previous provision and removed
the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”60 According
to the court, this was apparent because, while the original version of the
law had excluded murder and rape—which were not considered “Black”
crimes—the 1968 law included those crimes and excluded robbery.61 This
exemplifies how the courts have looked to relatively minor amendments to
state felon disenfranchisement laws as a means of dissociating current laws
from the racial motivations of the original laws they are based on.
In Hunter v. Underwood, plaintiffs successfully challenged a state’s
felon disenfranchisement provision under the Fourteenth Amendment for
the first time.62 There, two men argued that Article 8 §182 of the Alabama
Constitution was adopted to intentionally disenfranchise Blacks.63 Because
the state’s 1901 Constitutional Convention (where the provision was
adopted) was widely accepted to be “part of a movement that swept the
post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise Blacks,”64 the state was
forced to concede that part of the intent behind the provision was racially
discriminatory.65 Applying the test laid out in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,66 the Court asked whether the same pro-
visions would have been adopted without the discriminatory purpose of
disenfranchising Blacks.67 The state argued that an additional motivation
behind the provision was to disenfranchise poor Whites, and that this alter-
native purpose provided a permissible basis from which to uphold the
law.68 The Court rejected this argument, finding that the law was enacted
to discriminate against Blacks on account of race and that it would not
have been adopted absent this purpose.69 When considering whether Arti-
cle 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment nonetheless exempted §182 from the
possibility of an Equal Protection violation, the Court remarked, “we are
59. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F. 3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 391.
61. Id.
62. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
63. Id. at 224.
64. See id.; Shapiro, supra note 34, at 542.
65. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229.
66. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (out-
lining how to determine whether a facially neutral law was motivated by racially discriminatory
intent).
67. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 225.
68. Id. at 230–31.
69. Id. at 231.
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confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial dis-
crimination attending the enactment and operation of § 182 which other-
wise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion
in Richardson v. Ramirez suggests the contrary.”70 Thus, while reaffirming
the protection granted to felon disenfranchisement provisions generally
under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Hunter Court confirmed
that that protection does not shield provisions that violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause on the basis of racially discriminatory intent.71 In effect, this
holding means that opponents of the laws can still hang onto the possibility
that disenfranchisement provisions enacted with racially discriminatory in-
tent will be deemed unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Statutory Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement
With the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Section 2
amendment expanding the Act’s scope to cover voting practices that are
discriminatory in effect,72 some re-enfranchisement proponents saw a new
and more flexible angle from which to attack felon disenfranchisement
laws.73 Given the highly visible disparate impact of these provisions on
racial minorities, there was hope that the VRA could finally provide a path
to striking facially neutral laws down when discriminatory intent would be
difficult to prove.74
To the chagrin of voting rights activists, however, most VRA claims
against felon disenfranchisement laws have been unsuccessful in federal
courts.75 A common theme among these holdings is that the Fourteenth
Amendment protection of felon disenfranchisement laws described in
Richardson precludes them from falling under the authority of § 2 of the
VRA.76 The 11th Circuit described one facet of this argument in John-
son.77 There, the court determined that while § 2 of the VRA typically
extends to facially neutrally laws that have a racially disparate impact, be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly protects a state’s right to dis-
enfranchise felons, applying § 2 of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement
laws would “allow a congressional statute to override the text of the Con-
stitution.”78 In order to avoid this constitutional conflict, the Johnson court
70. Id. at 233.
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 34.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Pataki,
449 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1227-34
(11th Cir. 2005).
76. See Farrakhan, 623 F.3d at 993; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228.
77. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230.
78. Id.
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held that a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement provision cannot be
challenged on the basis of racially disparate impact under the VRA, but
can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of ra-
cially discriminatory intent.79
A year later, the 2nd Circuit provided additional reasoning as to why
the Voting Rights Act’s application to felon disenfranchisement laws
presents a constitutional conflict.80 In Hayden v. Pataki,81 plaintiffs alleged
that New York’s law disenfranchising felons had a discriminatory effect on
African Americans and Latinos and therefore violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.82 Significantly, the Hayden plaintiffs did not bring an
Equal Protection Claim or allege that the law was adopted with discrimi-
natory intent, but instead focused solely on the VRA’s disparate impact
provision.83 In a line of reasoning similar to the 11th Circuit’s in Johnson,
the Hayden court emphasized, “Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
explicitly leaves the federal balance intact with regard to felon disen-
franchisement laws specifically.”84 Therefore, the court continued, to ap-
ply Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws would be to disrupt the
states’ constitutionally protected right to adopt them.85 Given the sensitive
nature of this conflict, the court determined that the VRA should only be
held to apply to felon disenfranchisement provisions if Congress clearly
specified that it was intended to do so.86 Citing a lack of such specification,
the court declined to extend the statute to felon disenfranchisement
provisions.87
Similarly, in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, the 9th Circuit denied plaintiffs’
claim that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement provision violated Sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act because of its racially disparate impact.88
There, plaintiffs argued that the discriminatory effect on voting rights was
the result of a racially discriminatory criminal justice system.89 Citing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s affirmative sanction of criminal disenfranchise-
ment and a lack of evidence regarding Congress’s intent to extend the
application of the VRA felon disenfranchisement provisions, the court de-
clined to extend the VRA to Washington’s law.90
79. Id.
80. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 311.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 326.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 325–26.
87. Id. at 324–28.
88. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2010).
89. Id. at 992–93.
90. Id. at 993.
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Unlike the 11th and 2nd Circuits, however, the Farrakhan court em-
phasized that, for a VRA claim to be successful, “plaintiffs . . . must at least
show that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimina-
tion or that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such in-
tent.”91 This suggests that if plaintiffs had been able to show intentional
discrimination within Washington’s criminal justice system, the court may
have been more willing to apply the VRA to the state’s felon voting ban.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that to successfully challenge a
felon disenfranchisement provision under either the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs must go beyond showing dis-
criminatory effect and show that the state acted with discriminatory intent
when adopting its current provision or, potentially, show intentional dis-
crimination in the state’s criminal justice system itself.92 Although Su-
preme Court precedent on felon disenfranchisement provisions is minimal,
Hunter shows that despite the apparent protection offered to them under
§ 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court is willing to strike down
states’ provisions if plaintiffs make a showing of discriminatory intent.93
III. CHALLENGES TO PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
Although the Hunter decision affirmed that the Supreme Court is
willing to recognize racially discriminatory motivations behind felon dis-
enfranchisement laws, proving this discrimination in a modern context
presents lawyers and disenfranchised felons with several difficulties. This
section examines those challenges, with a specific focus on the law’s re-
sponse to changing social norms regarding race and class.
Although it is widely acknowledged that many—if not most—felon
disenfranchisement laws were adopted in their original form at least in part
to disenfranchise poor and minority voters,94 the discriminatory intent be-
hind the felon disenfranchisement provisions of today does not show itself
as obviously as it did in the past.95 Indeed, based on the litigation to date,
the Alabama constitutional provision examined in Hunter is an outlier; it is
the only modern felon disenfranchisement provision that has been recog-
nized by a court as motivated by racial animus.96 One reason for Alabama’s
outlier status is simply that most states have at some point amended their
provisions, often broadening their scope to include felonies that are per-
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. See Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d
990 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor of
Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
93. See Hunter, 471 U.S. 222.
94. See Holloway, supra note 19, at 934–35; Shapiro, supra note 34, at 542
95. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 568–69.
96. See Hunter, 471 U.S. 222. But see Cotton, 157 F.3d 388; Farrakhan, 623 F.3d 990;
Farrakhan, 338 F.3d 1009; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214; Richardson, 418 U.S.
24.
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ceived as traditionally “White” crimes.97 These amendments have allowed
states—even those with a tradition of discriminatory practices, such as
Mississippi in Cotton v. Fordice—to defend their current provisions on the
basis that the amendments eradicated any racially discriminatory intent that
may have motivated their passage originally.98
The amendment of felon disenfranchisement provisions to include
“White” crimes is at least in part responsive to changing social norms and
the threat of litigation against the provisions in their original forms.99 In
the 21st century, it is widely understood that enforcing a law based on
explicit racial bias like that exhibited in many state provisions a hundred
years ago is both socially unacceptable and unconstitutional.100 As such,
states, whether they are motivated by simply masking the racism present in
their laws or eliminating it, have been forced to change the language and
scope of their disenfranchisement provisions in response to these norms.101
Politicians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries manipulated the
polity by arguing that felon-voting bans were necessary because “a race
with a propensity for theft lacked self-control and was unsuited for full
citizenship.”102 At the height of the Jim Crow era, this portrayal of Blacks
as criminals supported the perpetuation of White supremacy.103 Because
these and other Jim Crow laws were typically upheld in courts through the
middle of the 20th century, the legislators who passed the original provi-
sions were free to be explicit in their desire to disenfranchise Blacks.104
Changing social norms and the rejection of overt racism in much of
the country have led to an evolution of the rhetoric used to justify felon
disenfranchisement provisions.105 In contrast to the explicit racial appeals
of the past, today, supporters of felon disenfranchisement laws are more
likely to justify them on the basis that those who have committed crimes
have forfeited their right to be trusted with the vote, without acknowledg-
ing the racial implications of felon voting bans.106 The importance of the
states’ right to disenfranchise felons also appears frequently in this dis-
course.107 For instance, in response to a proposal to restore the right to
97. See, e.g., Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391 (explaining the evolution of Mississippi’s felon disen-
franchisement provision from a law that included only crimes thought to be “Black crimes” to a
law that included crimes not previously associated with African Americans).
98. Id. at 391; see also Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1225.
99. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 568–72.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. 222 (wherein Alabama was forced to change its felon disen-
franchisement provision after its original provision was struck down).
102. Holloway, supra note 19, at 956.
103. Id.
104. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 568.
105. Id. at 570–73.
106. Id. at 572–73.
107. See id. at 570–71.
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vote to ex-felons, Senator Mitch McConnell defended states’ interest in
“reserving the right to vote for those who have abided by the social con-
tract,” also reminding his colleagues that they were “talking about rapists,
murderers, robbers, and even terrorists or spies.”108 Then Senator and cur-
rent Attorney General Jeff Sessions employed similar reasoning to oppose
the bill, emphasizing states’ interest in setting their own moral and public
standards.109
The problem for opponents of disenfranchisement rests not only on
the fact that these justifications ignore the racialized foundations of felon
disenfranchisement provisions, but also on the reality that persisting racial
discrimination behind the laws is either not explicitly expressed or is ex-
pressed in a racially coded way.110 When this is the case, plaintiffs are often
left with only statistical evidence of the disproportionate impact of the
provisions on people of color, which courts have determined is not suffi-
cient to show discriminatory intent.111 And significantly, despite ample
evidence of implicit bias against people of color in the criminal justice
system broadly, courts have so far been unwilling to consider that evidence
alone as sufficient proof of racial discrimination.112
IV. THE POLITICAL AND RACIAL MOTIVATIONS DRIVING FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT TODAY
Because the main barrier challengers of felon disenfranchisement
laws face is proving discriminatory intent, to overcome this barrier, it is
necessary to have a thorough understanding of how racism expresses itself
through these provisions in a modern context. In this section, I explore
various ways racism and racially-charged politics influence and are exacer-
bated by the felon disenfranchisement laws of today, with the hope of
providing knowledge that can be applied to the appropriate constitutional
test in the courts.113
108. 107 CONG. REC. 1494–95 (2002).
109. Id. at 1496.
110. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 572–73. See also Part IV(D), infra, for a discussion on
the forms of expression used by modern politicians to communicate racist ideals.
111. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2010).
112. See Erik J. Girvan, On Using The Psychological Science of Implicit Bias To Advance Anti-
Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (“To the extent that our goal is to use
the legal system, instrumentally, to remedy inequity illuminated by insights from work on im-
plicit bias, the resulting gap in legal protection from discriminatory actions that are perpetuated
accidentally, negligently, recklessly, or knowingly rather than purposefully, is inconsistent with
that goal . . . Judges must simply have failed at some point to recognize that discrimination can
occur without purpose.”).
113. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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A. Implicit Bias
While the racism prevalent today tends to be more subtle or implicit
than it was before the Civil Rights Movement, it is still possible to recog-
nize. Current psychological research shows that a majority of Americans
maintain some degree of implicit racial bias.114 Professor Erik Girvan de-
fines implicit bias as the unconscious inferences people make about others
as a result of our stereotypes, beliefs, and attitudes towards various
groups.115 Recent implicit bias research suggests that around 68% of
American adults implicitly favor Whites over Blacks.116
These inferences, although made unconsciously, can influence be-
haviors and perceptions in a tangible way.117 Experts on implicit racial bias
believe that it results in discrimination against people of color in a variety
of contexts.118 Studies have shown that it affects everything from school
discipline to employment and police practices.119
B. Racial Threat
Looking beyond how implicit bias affects individuals’ decision-mak-
ing and behavior, some scholars have examined how racial biases and fear
lead to increased support for racialized policies on the community or state
level.120 A growing body of research known as racial threat theory shows
that Whites respond to growing populations of non-Whites by using their
disproportionate power to implement state-sanctioned control mecha-
nisms.121 For example, various studies show that communities tend to
spend more funds on their police practices as the percentage of residents
who are Black increases.122 The same is true in towns near the U.S.-Mex-
ico border as the percentage of Hispanic residents increases.123
Scholars Behrens, Uggen, and Manza use the concept of racial threat
to support the idea that the felon disenfranchisement provisions in place
today remain motivated by racist ideals.124 While Whites and Democrats in
the post-Civil War era explicitly used the law to keep Blacks away from the
114. Girvan, supra note 112, at 13.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 34 (citing Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes
and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PYSCH. 1, 13–17 (2007)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 13–14.
120. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 18; Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Threat and Opposition to the
Re-Enfranchisement of Ex-Felons, INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC., Mar. 2012, at 13.
121. Cindy Brooks Dollar, Racial Threat Theory: Assessing the Evidence, Requesting Redesign,
J. CRIMINOLOGY, July 2014, at 1.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id.
124. Behrens, supra note 18.
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polls, and thus from political or economic power, Whites in power today
may be influenced by perceived threats from minority groups, and may in
turn react by disenfranchising those groups.125 Their 2002 study found
that the percentage of non-White prisoners in a region is directly related
to restrictive changes in felon disenfranchisement laws.126 Additionally, for
each 1% increase in the percentage of non-White prisoners, a state is 10%
more likely to pass its first felon disenfranchisement law.127 The study also
found that states with proportionally fewer African American prisoners but
relatively more African American residents have seen the fastest restoration
of voting rights to ex-felons.128
More recent research on racial threat has shown that the association
of African Americans with crime directly relates to attitudes about felon
disenfranchisement.129 One group of scholars found that the more strongly
Whites equate African Americans with crime, the more they oppose re-
enfranchisement of ex-felons, particularly those convicted of violent
crimes, which are most disproportionately associated with Blacks.130 They
also found that political conservatives are more likely to oppose re-en-
franchisement of ex-felons, except those convicted of illegally trading
stocks, a traditionally “White” crime.131
C. Political Threat and Implications of Expanding the Franchise
Pointing out that felon disenfranchisement provisions have always
been beneficial to political conservatives, experts have also shown how po-
litical motives may continue to incentivize more restrictive disenfranchise-
ment laws.132 In their research, Uggens and Manza show how felon
disenfranchisement provisions play a key role in suppressing the votes and
political power of marginalized groups.133 Using data on voter turnout and
voter intention from 1972-2000, they estimate that felon disenfranchise-
ment has resulted in significant losses for the Democratic party nation-
wide.134 In some cases, the voting power of felons and ex-felons would
have reversed the outcome of major elections.135 For instance, the re-
searchers estimate that during the presidential election of 2000, if felons
and ex-felons in Florida had been granted the franchise, Al Gore would
125. See id. at 574.
126. Id. at 583.
127. Id. at 586.
128. Id. at 594.
129. Chiricos et al., supra note 120.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id. at 21.
132. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 18, at 572–75.
133. See Manza, supra note 13, at 794–96.
134. Id. at 786–87.
135. Id. at 787–93.
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have won the state by over 80,000 votes and would have therefore received
the number of electoral votes required to win the presidency.136 Moreover,
felons and ex-felons are excluded from political participation in ways that
extend beyond the voting booths. For instance, those who are disen-
franchised may also be less likely to participate in other civic activities due
to increasingly negative perceptions about their relationship with the gov-
ernment and political process.137
In light of the political implications of restoring the vote to felons
and ex-felons, it is important to consider how the provisions differ de-
pending on the political balance at stake in each state. An overview of
felon disenfranchisement provisions nationwide shows that states identified
as “swing states” in the 2016 elections were more likely to have a more
restrictive disenfranchisement provision when compared to all states.138
27% of swing states have the most restrictive felon disenfranchisement pro-
visions,139 compared to 8% of states overall.140 In those states, the barriers
to re-enfranchisement have been strong. For instance, in 2016, the Gover-
nor of Virginia signed an executive order restoring voting rights to ex-
felons, yet the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that his order violated the
state constitution.141
This research and the massive number of Americans affected by felon
disenfranchisement in 2016 suggest that the effect of these provisions on
our most recent presidential election may be have been considerable. And
although today’s felon disenfranchisement provisions are facially neutral,
these and other studies show how perceived racial threat or threats to the
political status quo may play a role in bringing about harsher punishments
for convicted felons and opposition to felon re-enfranchisement.142 In this
136. Id. at 792.
137. See generally Amy E. Lerman Vesla M. Weaver, Political Consequences of the Carceral
State, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 817 (Nov. 2010) (discussing the overall impact of contact with
the criminal justice system on attitudes about government and civic engagement).
138. See Louis Nelson, Politico’s Battleground States Polling Average, POLITICO, http://www
.politico.com/2016-election/swing-states (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (displaying fall polling re-
sults from the eleven states considered to be swing states in the 2016 election: Colorado, Florida,
Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Wisconsin). See also State Felon Voting Laws, PRO CON.ORG (Oct. 5, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://
felonvoting.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000286 (giving a description of current
felon voting provisions by state).
139. See PROCON.ORG, supra note 138 (describing the provisions of Iowa, Virginia, and
Florida, which automatically disenfranchise first-time offenders permanently, but grant the gov-
ernor authority to restore voting rights on an individual basis after an ex-felon completes an
application for voting restoration).
140. Id. (this statistic includes the four states out of fifty (Iowa, Virginia, Florida, and Ken-
tucky) which permanently disenfranchise all ex-felons without an application to the governor).
141. Voting Restoration Efforts in Virginia, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-virginia.
142. See, e.g., Girvan, supra note 112, at 12.
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way, these data harken back to the Reconstruction and Jim Crow eras,
when “Black” crimes were punished more harshly than “White” crimes
and felon disenfranchisement was introduced as a tool to suppress and di-
lute the votes of African Americans and the poor.143
D. Symbolic Racism
Beliefs about the cultural inferiority of Blacks may also influence ef-
forts to reform institutional racism and the way politicians interact with
their constituents.144 While implicit biases and perceived racial or political
threat are rampant in the U.S., explicit expressions of racism also continue
to influence public policy.145 Some scholars describe explicit modern ra-
cism as “symbolic” rather than overt.146 This type of racism is based on
notions of cultural inferiority and the belief that some racial groups are
more likely to reject what they perceive as traditional American values,
such as work ethic and self-reliance.147 As recently as 2008, a representative
majority of White Americans surveyed agreed with statements that reflect
a symbolically racist ideology, including the idea that “if Blacks would
only try harder, they would be as well off as Whites.”148 At the same time,
a majority of White Americans stated that they preferred a neighborhood
where Whites were the clear majority.149
In her work on politics and racism, Tali Mendelberg shows how
many politicians and lawmakers use the racial fears and stereotypes har-
bored by White voters to their advantage.150 According to Mendelberg,
because of social norms of racial equality, politicians are driven to appear
racially neutral while at the same time appealing to racially resentful White
voters.151 A powerful example of this type of appeal is the image of Willie
Horton, an African American man convicted of raping a White woman,
used by George Bush in the 1988 presidential campaign.152 On the sur-
face, the ads incorporating Horton’s criminal history seemed to be about
being “tough on crime” rather than about race. However, the ads also very
clearly appealed to racial stereotypes representing Black men as dangerous
criminals.153
143. See Holloway, supra note 19.
144. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 569.
145. See Girvan, supra note 112, at 29–31.
146. See, e.g., Girvan, supra note 112, at 30.
147. Id., see also Behrens, supra note 18, at 569.
148. Girvan, supra note 112, at 31.
149. Id. at 30.
150. See TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT
MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY (2001).
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 1–4.
153. Id.
SPRING 2017] Concealed Motives 401
The Willie Horton story is part of a political rhetoric focusing on
crime and punishment that prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s.154 The “War
on Drugs,” which resulted in the almost constant portrayal of Black men as
drug dealers and “super-predators” in the media, may characterize that era
more than anything else.155 The “tough on crime” movement has led to a
500% increase in incarceration rates in the U.S., with disproportionate
rates of arrest, conviction, and strict sentencing for people of color.156
As the elections of 2016 and the first weeks of the Trump presidency
demonstrate, this type of rhetoric is far from behind us. Donald Trump’s
promises to build a wall to keep out “illegals,” his pledge to patrol Muslim
neighborhoods during the election and his subsequent banning of Muslims
from entering the country, and his description of Chicago as an “inner-
city hell,” among many other comments, reek of racist undertones. These
messages have appealed to a largely White and working class who many
argue feel threatened by the changing demographics of the United States.
And while the full impact of the Trump Administration on racialized poli-
cies in the U.S. remains to be seen, the political events of 2016 and early
2017 have demonstrated that racial resentment remains strong in America.
This type of racialized rhetoric can also be found in politicians’ de-
fenses of felon disenfranchisement laws.157 When asked in 2001 about the
disproportionate effect his state’s laws had on African Americans, South
Carolina Senator Thad Altman responded, “If it’s Blacks losing the right to
vote, then they have to quit committing crimes.”158 And when defending
the disenfranchisement of ex-felons, Senator Jeff Sessions argued in part
that felon disenfranchisement is a reflection of states’ moral standards and is
in the public interest, stating “each State has different standards based on
their moral evaluation, their legal evaluation, their public interest.”159 Al-
though some of these statements are race-neutral, they are all reminiscent
of an era when White politicians explicitly defended felon disenfranchise-
ment on the basis of the “peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of
character” they believed to be innate in African Americans.160
154. Netflix, 13th Official Trailer, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2016) at 0:55-1:30, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=V66F3WU2CKk.
155. See id. (showing media clips of politicians of the 1980s and 90s discussing tough-on-
crime policies, as well as footage of Black men being arrested and criminalized).
156. See Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017). See also Chung, supra note 4, at 3.
157. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 572–73.
158. Id. at 572.
159. Id. at 573.
160. Id. at 569.
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V. OPPORTUNITIES IN LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
Although a modern understanding of racism shows an association be-
tween racism and felon disenfranchisement laws, the courts have recog-
nized a racially discriminatory motivation only once, frustrating efforts to
rectify the racially disparate impact of the laws.161 This section provides
ideas about how approach barriers to expanding the franchise. Part A ana-
lyzes recent voting rights litigation to provide ideas about how to apply
knowledge of the association between modern racism and felon disen-
franchisement laws to a constitutional test in the courts. Drawing on the
implications of recent increases in civic engagement and changing public
opinion on criminal justice reform, Part B suggests that these conditions
provide a critical opportunity to draw attention to the problematic princi-
ples behind felon disenfranchisement, which in turn can lead to legislative
change.
A. Opportunities in Litigation
The Court’s evaluation of Alabama’s provision in Hunter provides the
basis from which to understand what a test to determine discriminatory
motive would look like today.162 There, the Court determined that the
proper approach to determining whether a facially neutral law which pro-
duces disproportionate effects along racial lines was outlined in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.163 In 2016, the
Fourth Circuit applied the same test in NAACP v. McCrory, where it held
that North Carolina’s 2013 voter ID statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.164
The Arlington Heights test directs courts to “undertake a sensitive in-
quiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.”165 The test specifies that discriminatory intent does not need to
be the sole or even primary motivation behind the law in question.166
However, the test also requires that the law is passed because of, and not in
spite of, racially discriminatory motivations.167 In other words, the test re-
quires a showing that racially discriminatory intent was a substantial moti-
vating factor behind the passage of the provision in question.
The Court in Arlington Heights laid out a non-exhaustive list of fac-
tors that can be considered to determine whether a law was motivated by
161. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
162. Id. at 227–28.
163. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67
(1977).
164. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 238 (2016).
165. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
166. Id. at 265–66.
167. NAACP, 831 F.3d at 220.
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racial discrimination168: 1) The historical background surrounding the
challenged decision; 2) The sequence of events leading up to the decision;
3) Departures from normal procedural sequence; 4) Legislative history; and
5) Disproportionate impact of the decision on one race.169 Because dis-
crimination today often takes on subtle forms, the court in NAACP em-
phasized that a holistic approach to examining these factors is
important.170 Once discriminatory intent has been shown, the burden
shifts to the defense to show that the law would have been passed without
any racially discriminatory motivation.171
While Hunter shows how the Court may approach a successful chal-
lenge to a felon disenfranchisement provision, NAACP reveals what courts
may consider relevant to the Arlington Heights factors in the present day and
in the context of evolving notions of racism.172 For that reason, a careful
look at the courts’ approaches in both of those cases is useful in determin-
ing what an effective discrimination challenge to a felon disenfranchise-
ment provision might look like today.
1. Historical Background
In Hunter, the historical background of Alabama’s felon disen-
franchisement provision undisputedly pointed at racial animus as the pri-
mary purpose its enactment.173 Unlike most other felon
disenfranchisement provisions of the 1980s, Alabama’s provision had not
been amended since the height of the Jim Crow era.174 Even proponents
of the provision conceded that the disenfranchisement of Blacks motivated
its passage.175 Thus, it was clear to the Court that the provision was indeed
“part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to disen-
franchise Blacks.”176
In 2016, the Fourth Circuit in NAACP v. McCrory undertook a
more comprehensive investigation into the historical background sur-
rounding the enactment of the North Carolina voter ID statute.177 There,
the court deemed it appropriate to look not only at North Carolina’s leg-
acy of discrimination in the voting context, but also of discrimination
168. Id. at 220.
169. Id. at 220–21 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–67).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 221.
172. Id.
173. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
174. See id. at 223 (stating that Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement provision was enacted
in 1901).
175. Id. at 230.
176. Id. at 229.
177. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 223–27 (2016).
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against African Americans in general.178 The court noted that, beginning
with the “reign of Jim Crow” in the state, attempts to dilute the Black vote
had been consistent.179 It also found significant the various instances since
the 1980s in which the state had attempted—albeit unsuccessfully—to en-
act laws that would likely dilute the Black vote. This showed that any
legislative actions, whether successful or not, to influence the vote based
on race are historically significant.180 Next, the court remarked that a
“pattern of laws producing discriminatory results provides important con-
text for determining whether the same decision-making body has also en-
acted a law with discriminatory purpose,”181 indicating that racially
discriminatory results in a state’s body of law as a whole may be relevant.
Finally, the court noted that the fact that the historical link between race
and party in North Carolina was a relevant factor when considering
whether the law in question was motivated by racial discrimination.182 Be-
cause African Americans, who were voting in record high numbers at the
time the voter ID law was passed, had historically voted almost exclusively
for the Democratic Party, there may have been a stronger incentive for
Republicans to try to dilute the Black vote.183
As Hunter and NAACP reveal, various aspects of the history behind a
facially neutral voting law matter when determining whether it was en-
acted with discriminatory intent.184 When applied to felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions, the courts’ historical analyses in these cases show that a
state’s history of racially discriminatory policies overall is relevant, both in
and outside of the voting context.185 Therefore, any attack on a current
felon disenfranchisement law would likely require a comprehensive over-
view of the state’s discriminatory legislation, including any legislation that
appears facially neutral but disproportionately affects non-Whites,186 such
as legislation that has led to the rise in incarceration of people of color.187
As Hunter shows, to the greatest extent possible, this should also include a
showing that felon disenfranchisement provisions have been used histori-
cally in the state to prevent African Americans and other oppressed groups
178. Id.
179. Id. at 223–25 (noting the disenfranchisement of the state’s African Americans during
the Jim Crow Era and then discussing various instances since the 1980s wherein the North
Carolina legislature “attempted to suppress and dilute the voting rights of African Americans.”).
180. See id. at 224–25.
181. Id. at 223–24.
182. Id. at 225.
183. Id. at 225–26.
184. See id. at 223–27.
185. Id. at 223–24.
186. See id.
187. See Incarceration, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/
incarceration (last visited Jan. 14,2017) (containing resources on trends in U.S. incarceration,
including information on legislation and racial disparities).
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from voting.188 And as NAACP demonstrates, courts might also consider
attempts to dilute the non-White vote in the decades surrounding the pas-
sage of the state’s current felon disenfranchisement provision.189
Next, although the NAACP court did not use the term “racial
threat,” its analysis suggests that some notion of racial threat theory may be
relevant in uncovering racially discriminatory intent behind a voting provi-
sion.190 By emphasizing the importance of the historical link between race
and party, the court indicates that the threat of waning political power
posed by an increased number of non-White voters to a particular party is
a relevant consideration under Arlington Heights.191 It follows that a suc-
cessful attack on a felon disenfranchisement provision, particularly one that
is more restrictive than its predecessor, may involve a claim that the provi-
sion was enacted at least partially in response to perceived political threat
from an increasing number of minority voters. Other indications of per-
ceived racial threat, such as the restrictiveness of the state’s law as related to
its proportion of non-White inmates, may also be relevant.192
2. Sequence of Events and Departures from Normal Procedure
In addition to the general history surrounding a facially neutral law,
the specific sequence of events leading up to its passage is relevant in deter-
mining whether it was enacted with racially discriminatory intent.193 In
NAACP, the court emphasized that any “departures from the normal pro-
cedural sequence” should be particularly closely scrutinized.194 There, the
state legislature’s actions leading up to the passage of SL 2013-381 were a
clear departure from the norm.195 The law had been proposed immedi-
ately following the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder
that states which had historically used voting legislation in a discriminatory
way no longer needed to seek federal approval under § 5 of the VRA
before passing new voting-related legislation, because the coverage formula
prescribed by § 4(b) of the VRA, which determined which states were
188. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985) (discussing the Alabama dele-
gates’ decision to amend their state’s felon disenfranchisement provision to target African Ameri-
cans and the persisting effect of that law).
189. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 223 (2016).
190. See id. at 225–26 (acknowledging the fact that the recent success Democratic candi-
dates in North Carolina was related to unprecedented African American voter participation, and
suggesting that this may have motivated Republican efforts to dilute the Black vote).
191. Id.
192. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 596–99 for a discussion of findings showing that racial
compositions of prison inmates by state relate to the restrictiveness of states’ felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions.
193. See NAACP, 831 F.3d at 227–29 (applying one facet of the test laid out Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 249 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)).
194. Id. at 227.
195. Id. at 227–29.
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subject to preclearance under 5, was unconstitutional.196 For the North
Carolina legislature, this meant that they had the ability to determine what
their voter ID laws would look like without federal approval for the first
time since 1965.197 Within days of the Shelby County decision, the state’s
Republicans proposed its most restrictive voter ID law since the enactment
of the VRA and rushed it through the legislature.198 The restrictions were
extensive and had a hugely disproportionate impact on African Ameri-
cans.199 The court held that the timing and sequence of events, although
not dispositive by itself, was highly suggestive of the legislature’s discrimi-
natory purpose.200
Given the long history of felon disenfranchisement laws in the U.S.,
it is unlikely that the sequence of events leading up to the passage of any
specific provision or amendment would appear as obviously unusual as the
voter ID provision did in NAACP.201 Other barriers stem from the fact
that, while many of the country’s earlier felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions were enacted in response to the Reconstruction Amendments, most
of those provisions have been amended202; thus, the sequence of events
that must be examined is the sequence of events leading up to the passage
of the amendment rather than the original provision.203
Even so, an examination of the sequence of events leading up to a
state’s current felon disenfranchisement law may be telling, particularly if
the newest version of the law is more restrictive than its predecessor.204
Relevant events may include a change in party control in the state, a recent
liberalization of voting laws, or some other factor suggestive of an incen-
tive to dilute the non-White vote.205 Additionally, a court should consider
whether the provision could be viewed as responsive to a larger movement
to criminalize and marginalize African Americans in the state at the time
of its passage.206
196. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
197. See NAACP, 831 F.3d at 229 (discussing the significance of the abolishment of the
pre-clearance requirement).
198. Id. at 227–28.
199. Id. at 227 (discussing the expansion of the bill post-Shelby County).
200. Id. at 229.
201. See id. at 227–29 (discussing the highly unusual nature of the events leading up to the
passage of SL 2013-381).
202. See discussion in Part III, infra. See also Behrens, supra note 18, at 565.
203. See Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (1998).
204. See CHUNG, supra note 4, at 4 (listing each state’s most recent changes in felon disen-
franchisement provisions and describing the nature of those changes).
205. See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 227–29 (2016).
206. See Mendelberg, supra note 150, for a discussion of the criminalization of African
Americans via politics.
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3. Legislative History
Hunter and NAACP reaffirmed the Court’s assertion in Arlington
Heights that while legislative history can be difficult to maintain and may
not always be an accurate indicator of legislative intent, it nonetheless can
be an important consideration in determining whether racial discrimina-
tion motivated the passage of a facially neutral law.207
In Hunter, the legislative history behind Alabama’s felon disen-
franchisement provision was unusually straightforward.208 In fact, the pres-
ident of the convention where the provision was enacted stated that the
purpose of the convention was “to establish White supremacy in [the]
state.”209 Unsurprisingly, over one hundred years later, the North Carolina
legislature in question in NAACP did not so clearly state a discriminatory
purpose during the legislation process.210 The court in that case also noted
that statements made after the passage of the legislation in question are “of
limited value.”211 However, the court did find it significant that the North
Carolina General Assembly requested and used race data in connection
with the drafting of the law, which supported the contention that race was
a consideration of the legislature.212
Additionally, while the court asserted that statements by only a few
legislators had limited significance, it also discussed certain statements
made my lawmakers at multiple points in the opinion.213 For instance, the
court found it notable that a stated purpose of the bill was “to move the
law back to the way it was.”214 The court also noted that after the Shelby
County decision, one of the bill’s drafters remarked that it was time to
“move ahead with the full bill.”215 Finally, the court mentioned that mul-
tiple Democrats characterized the bill as “voter suppression of minorities”
or as “partisan.”216
While fairly explicit, these statements are characteristic of the type of
“symbolic” or “modern” racism described by scholars like Girvin,
Meldelberg, and Behrens.217 The court’s consideration of these statements
implies that an attack on felon disenfranchisement provisions should in-
clude an examination of any statements that subtly connect the current law
207. See Hunter v. Underwood, 371 U.S. 222, 229 (1985); NAACP, 831 F.3d at 229–230.
208. Hunter, 371 U.S. at 228–29.
209. Id. at 229.
210. See NAACP, 831 F.3d at 229.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 230.
213. See id. at 226–28.
214. Id. at 226.
215. Id. at 216.
216. Id. at 228.
217. Behrens, supra note 18, at 569; Girvan, supra note 112, at 12; Mendelberg, supra note
150, at 1–12.
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with past social conditions that allowed for greater disenfranchisement of
non-Whites.218 It might also include statements, like those made by Sena-
tors Altman and Sessions,219 that suggest an appeal to the fears of White
voters of African American criminality.220 In turn, this may require a
showing that a “tough on crime” stance is connected to race and has a
racial effect.221 Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s attention to the General As-
sembly’s use of race data in connection with SL 2013-381 shows that any
use of data related to race and crime during the legislative process would
be important in determining whether a felon disenfranchisement provision
was motivated by racial considerations.222
4. Disparate Impact
The final factor considered in the Arlington Heights test is whether the
provision in question has disproportionately burdened members of one
race over another.223 In Hunter, the Court noted that Alabama’s felon dis-
enfranchisement provision had always had and continued to have a signifi-
cantly disproportionate impact on African Americans in the state.224
Similarly, in NAACP, the Fourth Circuit found “abundant support” for
the claim that SL 2013-21 disproportionately burdened Blacks, and found
this fact to be of great import.225
Like the plaintiffs in Hunter and NAACP, those attacking virtually
any felon disenfranchisement provision today would have ample evidence
to support the assertion that the provision disproportionately affects non-
Whites, particularly African Americans.226 The overall effect of the laws is
that Blacks in the U.S. remain thirteen times as likely as Whites to be
disenfranchised.227 Also relevant is the fact that African Americans are
more likely to be arrested, charged, and convicted of felonies than
Whites,228 which makes them more likely to be affected by felon disen-
franchisement laws. And in states like Iowa and Florida, where ex-felons
can only be re-enfranchised by writing a personal appeal to the governor,
218. See Behrens, supra note 18, at 668–73 (discussing the link between statements indica-
tive of modern racism today and the explicitly racist rhetoric of the past).
219. Id. at 572–73.
220. See Mendelberg, supra note 150, at 1–12.
221. See id.
222. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 230 (2016).
223. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
224. Hunter, 371 U.S. at 227 (1985).
225. NAACP, 831 F.3d at 231.
226. See, e.g., CHUNG, supra note 4, at 2.
227. Id.
228. See generally NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING RACIAL
INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (May 2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/black-lives-matter-eliminating-racial-inequity-in-the-criminal-justice-system. See
also Girvan, supra note 113, at 1–2, 7.
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these appeals are less likely to be granted for African Americans than
Whites.229 In some cases, especially where race is closely tied to political
party association, the large-scale effect of felon disenfranchisement may be
that Black voters and those with liberal views are prevented from electing
the candidate of their choice.230
B. Political and Legislative Opportunity
While it is important to learn from recent legal precedent, the cur-
rent political climate and changing public opinion may also provide an
opportunity for expansive legislative reform. A growing body of evidence
reveals that most Americans support criminal justice reform measures, in-
cluding shifting investments from incarceration to more effective rehabili-
tation and re-entry measures.231 This research suggests that public opinion
on effective re-entry aligns with increased efforts to expand the franchise
to felons and ex-felons, which has resulted in the liberalization of felon
disenfranchisement laws in over 30 states since the 1990s.232
Nonetheless, as the Trump Administration’s keen attention to “law
and order”233 shows, opportunities for politicians to effectively capitalize
on racialized fears and resentment persist. Indeed, although recent years
have seen bipartisan support for criminal justice reform at the federal level,
Attorney General Jeff Sessions has a long history of opposing reforms. He
has been vocal about his support of felon disenfranchisement.234 The im-
plications of his leadership for reform proponents should therefore be
taken seriously.
Still, the juxtaposition of changing public opinion on felon reintegra-
tion and the backward-looking views of the current administration may
provide the right political momentum from which to call attention to
felon disenfranchisement. Those who support common sense reforms
need only look at data about the benefits of voting, including reduced
229. Brief for League of Women Voters as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19,
Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 2016) (No. 15-1661).
230. See generally Manza, supra note 1.
231. See, e.g., ACLU Nationwide Poll on Criminal Justice Reform, AM. C.L. UNION (last
visited May 23, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-nationwide-poll-criminal-justice-re-
form; JILL MIZELL & LOREN SIEGEL, THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC
OPINION AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES (Julie Fisher-Rowe & Juhu Thukral
eds., 2014); MELLMAN GROUP & PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, NATIONAL KEY SURVEY
FINDINGS – FEDERAL SENTENCING & PRISONS (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/assets/2016/02/national_survey_key_findings_federal_sentencing_prisons.pdf.
232. See Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2016), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx; Myrna Perez et al.,
The Sustained Momentum and Growing Bipartisan Consensus for Voting Rights Restoration, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (July 6. 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/sustained-momentum-
and-growing-bipartisan-consensus-voting-rights-restoration.
233. See discussion supra Part IV.
234. See 107th Cong. 2d Session s802-s803.
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recidivism rates, to understand that communities benefit from expanding
the franchise to felons and ex-felons.235
Moreover, recent increases in civic engagement among those who
are dissatisfied with the current state of American democracy, reflected by
a growing number of town halls and record-breaking protests in 2017,236
provide an opportunity to call attention to those who are unable to fully
exercise the rights of citizenship, especially the disenfranchised.
CONCLUSION
The United States has a long and complicated history with felon dis-
enfranchisement provisions. First used as a tool for disenfranchising poor
and Black voters during Reconstruction, the laws continue to dispropor-
tionately affect people of color, and to date have kept millions of Ameri-
cans out of the polls. They have proven to be a major barrier to
democracy, at times altering the course of major U.S. elections. Research
suggests that rather than reducing crime, this barrier to civic engagement
only has negative repercussions for individuals and communities. Although
many felon disenfranchisement provisions remain connected to racist
objectives, the facially neutral language of the provisions has made proving
an Equal Protection or Voting Rights Act violation particularly difficult.
Still, recent litigation shows that with the right set of knowledge and anal-
yses, successfully challenging the constitutionality of these provisions in
court may remain a possibility. Moreover, changing attitudes about the
importance of civic engagement, criminal justice reforms, and the reinte-
gration of incarcerated people into society suggest that Americans are
more ready than ever for legislative changes to restore the franchise.
235. See Manza, supra note 1.
236. See Sean McMinn, More Democrats Holding Town Halls this Presidents Day Recess, ROLL-
CALL.COM (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/amid-liberal-
protests-more-democrats-holding-town-halls-this-presidentsday-recess (describing an increase in
town halls held by both Democratic and Republican members of Congress over the Presidents
Day recess in 2017 compared to previous years).
